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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.980230-CA

v.
DENNY DUKE KANDT,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of aggravated assault, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998), and a group criminal
activity enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) (copies of these
statutes are attached in Add. A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW1
1. Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance below when he:
a. failed to object to admission of any of the gang-related evidence;
b. failed to object to testimony about the possibility of future gang violence or
retaliation; and
c. failed to call more than one alibi witness and defendant himself to testify?
Because the trial court ruled on this claim in the context of defendant's post-trial
motion for a new trial, this claim presents a mixed question of law and fact on appeal.
State v. Classon. 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah
1997). This Court must defer to the trial court's findings of fact, but reviews its legal
conclusions nondeferentially for correctness. Id.; State v. Perry. 899 P.2d 1232, 1238-39
(Utah App. 1995). reh'g denied (Aug. 14, 1995).
2. Did the trial court properly admit evidence of both the victim's and the
defendant's gang membership and the relationship of that information to the charged
assault, pursuant to the parties' agreement?
The decision to admit or exclude evidence under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence,
is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283,291
(Utah App.), cert, granted. (Oct. 10, 1998); State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah
App. 1997), affd, 359 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah Dec. 29,1998); State v. Jacques. 924

!

The State has reorganized defendant's points on appeal because the disposition of
the claims lends itself more readily to the modified organization.

2

P.2d 898, 900 (Utah App. 1996).2 However, as defense counsel's agreement invited any
error in admission of the evidence, defendant is not entitled to appellate review of his
claim. State v. Stevenson. 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d
13 (Utah 1995).
3. Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of aggravated assault?
On appeal, this issue is reviewed with great deference to the jury verdict. State v.
Jiron. 882 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). The
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994). "'Where there
is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which
findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our
inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict.'" Jiron. 882 P.2d at 691 (quoting State
v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)) (additional quotation omitted); see also State
v. Hall. 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998).
Reversal is not warranted unless the evidence is "so inconclusive or inherently
2

Defendant does not recognize this well-established standard of review, but cites to
a less-deferential standard applied to the admission or exclusion of gruesome photographs
under rule 403. Br. of Aplt. at 2,11. Aside from the fact that this jurisdiction has never
recognized gang-related evidence to be one of the "certain categories of relevant
evidence" to which the less deferential test is applied (see State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221,
1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988)), this Court need
not consider whether gang-related evidence warrants a different standard of review
because the evidence was admitted below pursuant to the parties' agreement, and
defendant fails to acknowledge the existence or challenge the validity of the agreement.
3

improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime." Jiron. 882 P.2d at 691.
Moreover, a claim of insufficient evidence will not be reviewed unless the
appellant marshals the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and demonstrates how the
evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, is insufficient to support the verdict.
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 60708 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief,
including:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995); and
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated assault, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998), and faced a group
criminal activity enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), based on
the allegation that he committed the assault with two or more persons (R. 6-10). The day
of trial, the prosecutor amended the information to reflect a third degree felony (R. 6364). Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 125).
4

Defendant then sought to have the group criminal activity enhancement charge stricken
(R. 130-31), and obtained private counsel (R. 143-45). Defendant's new counsel, who
also represents defendant on appeal, filed a motion for a new trial, claiming: unfair
prejudice from introduction of gang-related evidence, insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict, and ineffective assistance of counsel for, among other things, failure
to object to gang-related evidence, failure to call additional alibi witnesses, and failure to
permit defendant to testify (R. 149-54). After briefing and argument, the district court
denied the new trial motion (R. 235-39) as well as the motion to strike the enhancement
(R. 186-88), then court imposed a sentence of no more than five years in prison for the
aggravated assault with a three-year consecutive term for the enhancement (R. 159).
Defendant timely appealed, presenting to this Court the same express arguments
noted above which were included below in his motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Dino Hernandez had been a gang member for a number of years (R. 249: 7-8).4
Initially, he associated with Diamond Street gang, but after about a year, he turned to the
Salt Lake Posse, with which he was associated on July 28, 1997 (]d.).
3

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Pavne. 964 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah
App. 1998).
4

Because each of the transcripts in this case have been given a single record
number, citation herein to these documents will be to the number stamped on the cover of
each transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number (i.e., R. 249: 7).
5

On that day, Dino was driving on the west side of Salt Lake City at 5:30 p.m. when
he received a page (R. 249: 11,28). He noticed a nearby phone booth at a Pizza Hut near
700 North and Redwood Road and pulled into the parking lot (R. 249: 12). Because he
was a gang member and all gang members are "potential targets", he drove around the
restaurant a couple of times to see if he saw anyone from a rival gang (R. 249: 13-14,
109). Seeing no one, he decided to stop and answer the page (id.). A few cars were
parked facing the curb infrontof the phone booth, which was attached to the outside of
the building, so Dino parked behind them, parallel to the building, left his door open, and
went to use the phone (R. 249: 12-14, 52).
He picked up the handset but had not completed the call when he saw three
members of a rival gang approach him (R. 249: 14-15). They approached him so quickly
that he was able to see only the one in front of the group before the beating began and
recognized him as a member of the Diamond Street gang (R. 249: 14-15, 18). Dino was
beaten into a near-fetal position, keeping himself upright on one knee but doubled over
and protecting his face as he was hit and kicked by the trio (R. 249: 15-16). He felt
several crushing blows to the back of his head from a hard, heavy object he thought might
be a rock (R. 249: 17). Amid the yelling and the chaos of the thirty-to-sixty second
beating, Dino heard defendant's voice (R. 249: 17-18,29-30). Having known defendant
over several years and having had several prior confrontations with him, Dino was
confident that it was defendant's voice that he heard (R. 249: 6-7, 18-19).
6

When the beating ceased, Dino managed to drag himself into the Pizza Hut, where
the employees called 911 and tried to stop the bleeding from the open wound on the back
of his head (R. 249: 19-20, 54). Upon hearing about the phone call, Dino left and drove
to a nearby friend's house (R. 249: 20). However, within ten minutes of arriving, he had
someone drive him to the hospital because of the searing pain in his head (R. 249: 20).
The wounds on Dino's head took 40 stitches to close, and his injuries forced him to quit
his job and to stop driving (R. 249: 20-22, 27).
Dino quickly discovered that he had lost his pager during the assault (R. 249: 19).
He began receiving calls at his house, as did several friends of his who had previously
paged him, from one of the males who had assaulted him (R. 249: 19, 23). The caller
bragged about who it was and what had happened (id.). Dino became concerned that his
house might be targeted by the rival gang, and worry for his three young children
prompted him to contact the local gang unit to ask the police to watch his house when
they were patrolling (R. 249: 23). A couple of days later, two officers stopped by and
Dino told them the details of the assault (R. 249: 24-25).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I; Defendant fails to establish any of his three claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. His claim that counsel failed to object to evidence of future
gang violence is inadequately briefed, permitting this Court to decline to reach the claim
as it violates the appellate briefing rule.
7

Defense counsel made a well-reasoned decision to agree to admission of gangrelated evidence to enable him to attack the victim's veracity by show-casing the victim's
motive to lie and falsely implicate defendant, while still asserting defendant's alibi
defense. Such reasonable trial strategy does not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Defense counsel's use of a single witness to present the alibi defense was also a
matter of legitimate trial strategy. Counsel had at least two other witnesses present at
trial, indicating that he would be calling at least one of them. However, after presenting a
single alibi witness, counsel decided not to call any others. The record shows that
counsel was afraid that additional testimony might contradict and dilute the testimony
already given, and the affidavits of the proposed witnesses contain sufficient
inconsistencies to support this concern. Counsel may also have been concerned about the
fact that all proposed witnesses, including defendant himself, would be subject to crossexamination. The State noted some of the evidence it was prepared to present on cross
had the witnesses been called, and defense counsel may have felt the additional risk to the
defense was not worth the additional testimony. On this record, counsel's decision not to
adduce further alibi testimony appears to be well-reasoned trial strategy and does not
amount to ineffective assistance.
Point II: Defendant's claim of error in the admission of gang-related evidence at
trial fails because his counsel agreed to the admission in order to further his trial strategy
8

of using the victim's gang membership and history of gang involvement to challenge the
victim's veracity and motives. That strategy was reasonable under the facts of this case
(see Point I). Consequently, the invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this
claim.
Point III: There was ample evidence adduced at trial to support the jury's
determination that defendant was guilty at least as an aider or abettor, if not as a principal,
in the assault on the victim. The evidence concerning the fact that the victim and
defendant had known each other for years and had clashed in the past, independent of any
mention of gang activity, supported the victim's positive identification of defendant's
voice during the assault and suggested a possible motive for his participation.
Defendant's possession and use of the victim's pager, lost at the scene of the assault, to
contact various friends of the victim to brag about his identity and the assault supports
findings that defendant was present at the assault and harbored the requisite intent. Other
evidence which suggested that defendant drove the trio to the scene, made no attempt to
prevent the assault, then immediately left with the group provides added support for the
jury's determination. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury
could find that defendant intentionally aided and encouraged, if not actively participated
in, the assault, justifying a guilty verdict.

9

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF ONE CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL, AND THE RECORD
REFLECTS THAT THE REMAINING TWO CLAIMS OF COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO ACT WERE A MATTER OF TRIAL STRATEGY
In Point III of his brief, defendant attacks his trial counsel's effectiveness on three
grounds. First, he argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing object to admission
of all gang-related information at trial. Br. of Aplt. at 22. Second, defendant faults his
counsel's failure to object to any testimony related to the victim's fear of possible future
gang violence or retaliation. Id at 22-23. Third, defendant claims his trial counsel failed
to adequately present his defense because he did not call additional witnesses or
defendant himself to corroborate the testimony of one defense witness that defendant was
with her at the time of the assault. Id. at 23. However, defendant fails to carry his burden
of establishing any of these claims on appeal.
A.

Standard of Review
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, appellant must show that trial

counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
trial's outcome. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Strickland
v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,693,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,2067 (1984)); State v.
Perrv. 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). To show deficient performance, defendant
must prove that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of
10

reasonableness." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d
1118 (Utah 1997); see also State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah App. 1998), cert
granted. (Oct. 10, 1998). This requires that defendant identify the specific acts or
omissions that "'fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'"
Classon. 935 P.2d at 532 (quoting State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986)).
Defendant's claim may not be purely speculative, but must be a demonstrative reality.
State v. Severance. 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992). Because of the extremely
broad deference afforded to trial counsel's choices concerning trial strategy (id; Perry.
899 P.2d at 1239), appellant must demonstrate "'that counsel's actions were not
conscious trial strategy,'" Winward. 941 P.2d at 635 (quoting State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d
578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (additional quotations omitted)), and "'that there was a 'lack
of any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's actions.'" Id. (quoting State v. Moritzskv.
771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)).
To establish the requisite prejudice, defendant must show that the alleged errors
were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Classon. 935 P.2d at 532. This
requires a showing that a "reasonable probability" exists that the trial would have had a
different result absent counsel's errors. Finlavson. 956 P.2d at 293; Classon. 935 P.2d at
532. A "reasonable probability" is a probability that is "'sufficient to undermine
confidence in the reliability of the outcome.'" Classon. 935 P.2d at 532 (quoting
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068); see also Finlavson. 956 P.2d at 294.
11

Bi

Defense Counsel's Failure To Object To Admission Of Gang-Related
Evidence Was A Matter Of Legitimate Trial Strategy
A review of the record defeats defendant's first claim-that his trial counsel failed

to object to admission of all gang-related evidence. At the hearing on defendant's motion
for a new trial, the parties addressed defendant's ineffective assistance claims. The
prosecutor reminded the trial judge that the parties had discussed the matter of gangrelated evidence with her in her chambers prior to trial (R. 255: 28-29) (a copy of the
exchange is attached in Add. B). The parties informed the judge that they had agreed
that both sides would be inquiring at trial into the matter of gang membership (R. 255:
29). Add. B. Defendant's trial counsel intended to highlight the victim's gang
affiliations and his grudge against defendant in order to attack the victim's credibility and
establish a motive for the victim to falsely accuse defendant of this crime (id.). Add. B.
The prosecutor felt that if gang membership were to be made an issue, then the State
should be permitted to adduce evidence of defendant's membership in Diamond Street
gang (id,'). Add. B.
The parties informed the trial court in the pre-trial conference of their agreement
on the gang evidence issue and, based on that agreement, the parties and the court
extensively discussed gang-related questions with the jury venire (R. 250:45-46,65-66,
71-75,91,96-104,109-10,116-19,134-37,144,164-65), the prosecutor made references
to gang-related matters in his opening statement to diffuse the possible impact of the
12

information when defendant discussed it (R. 250: 167-68, 171-72; 255: 30), and both
sides adduced gang-related evidence at trial without objection (R. 249: 7-10,40-43,4445, 83-89). Add. B.
In rejecting defendant's claim of ineffective assistance on this issue, the trial court
stated:
While in hindsight the things that former counsel did might have appeared
to have been mistaken strategy, I think it very clearly was part of his trial strategy;
in other words, that the victim was a gang member who was assaulted by rival
gang members but we weren't there.
And in fact, that was said in conversation between counsel and I. I don't
recall at what stage of the proceedings it was, it may have been when we were
discussing witnesses or it may have been during voir dire process or at some other
point, but that was raised because counsel both made it clear to me that part of the
defendant's trial strategy was to allow that [gang] evidence in because their
defense was he wasn't there, so it didn't really matter.
It also appears to me that had that not been part of the trial strategy, much
of that clearly went to motive, to explain an otherwise unexplainable assault.
(R. 255: 46-47) (a copy of the ruling is attached in Add. B).5
Defense counsel's agreement to the arrangement was consistent with a reasonable
trial strategy. State v. Hall. 946 P.2d 712, 717 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied. 953 P.2d
449 (Utah 1998). He was able to use the information to his best advantage as part of a

5

The actual pre-trial discussion on gang evidence does not appear in the record,
there was no evidentiary hearing below involving defendant's claims of ineffective
assistance, and defendant has sought no remand pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. However, the memories of both the prosecutor and the trial court as
stated during the motion hearing below are not disputed by defendant.

13

well-reasoned tactic designed to attack the victim's veracity by show-casing his motive to
lie and to implicate defendant falsely, while still asserting defendant's alibi defense. See
People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 372 (Cal. 1991) ("[Evidence of gangs [is] a twin sword
which could be utilized by the defense in attacking the credibility of the victim."), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1062(1992).
Defense counsel's strategy was apparent in his opening statement:
Well, now, wait a minute, you say, how can that be? Already we have a
conflict. The victim's going to be saying that Denny did it to him. Denny's
friends will be saying, No, he was with us all the time. Somebody is telling a lie
here and that's what you'll be asked to listen to today as you listen to every single
witness who gets on that witness stand, look at them, use all of your experience of
human nature concerning truth or lie, as each witness is on that stand and ask,
Who's telling the truth here? Who's telling a lie?
What motivation would anyone have to tell the truth here or a lie? Well, the
evidence will show that Dino [the victim] testified under oath at a prior hearing
and at the prior hearing, he admitted to being a gang member, he admitted prior
confrontations with Denny, in which a friend of the victim, a friend of Dino's,
threw a rock through-at Denny's house.
Dino, the victim, will testify that he held a grudge against Denny. Consider
that and consider-ask motivation when Dino gets on the stand."
(R. 250: 176-77) (counsel's opening statement is attached in Add. C).
As the trial developed, defense counsel acted on that strategy. At trial, the victim
admitted being a member of a gang called the Salt Lake Posse and testified to his history
of gang involvement (R. 249: 7-10). Aside from the affiliation of both defendant and the
victim with rival gangs, the gang-related evidence dealt primarily with the victim.
Defendant's trial counsel questioned the victim at length about a prior gang-related
14

confrontation between the victim and defendant in which defendant was the victim (R.
249:40-43). Defense counsel established that the victim had a gang-related "grudge"
against defendant and against defendant's gang (R. 249: 43), and implied throughout the
trial that the victim had falsely identified defendant to effectuate that "grudge" (R. 249:
41-43, 107-08; 250: 176-77,231).

This theme was joined with trial counsel's attack on

the victim's "voice only" identification of defendant and defendant's use of an alibi
witness to establish that he was not at the scene of the assault (R. 249: 28-30, 93-124;
250: 230-31). Finally, in closing, defense counsel suggested that Dino "may be
retaliating" or using this as "a way to get back at Denny" because of the admitted grudge
(R. 250: 231).
While defendant's appellate counsel might not agree with former counsel's
conscious trial strategy-in fact, he fails to even acknowledge it-nothing in the record
establishes that it was unreasonable or fell below "an objective standard of
reasonableness".
C.

Review Of Defense Counsel's Failure To Object To Evidence Of Future Gang
Violence Is Not Warranted Because Of Inadequate Briefing
Defendant separately attacks his trial counsel's failure to object to evidence

implying the possibility of future gang violence. Br. of Aplt. at 22-23. However, the
argument fails to comply with this Court's briefing rule.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that defendant's brief
include an argument which "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
15

with respect to the issues presented .. with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on." Defendant's argument consists of three sentences and no citation
to legal authority. Br. of Aplt. at 22-23. Defendant summarily claims that trial counsel
should have moved to strike testimony and sought admonishment of the jury because the
evidence of future gang violence was "inflammatory" and not reasonably justifiable. Id.
However, defendant does not establish a legal basis for such a motion or otherwise justify
his position. Because the argument fails to meet the briefing requirements of rule 24(a),
this Court should not address the issue. See State v. Haga. 954 P.2d 1284, 1287 n.3 (Utah
App. 1998); see also State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (finding that a
claim consisting of citation to constitutional provisions and a single case without any
analysis of what the authority requires and how the facts of the case apply to the cited
authority constitutes inadequate briefing).6

6

The evidence consisted of testimony that: 1) the victim delayed reporting the
incident out of a fear of possible retaliation by Diamond Street involving his house and
his three children; and 2) the victim did not testify voluntarily because he was afraid of
being labeled a "snitch" and being targeted by gang members (R. 249: 23-27). Fear of
retaliation is relevant and admissible as it goes to the issue of credibility. United States
v. Abel. 469 U.S. 45, 49, 105 S. Ct. 465, 467 (1984); United States v. Kevs. 899 F.2d
983, 987 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 858 (1990); seg also United States v. Santiago.
46 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 515 U.S. 1162 (1995). In this case, the testimony
was the victim's own explanation of his reporting delay, of his ultimate reason for calling
the police, of his earlier hesitancy to speak to police either at Pizza Hut or at the hospital,
of his reluctance to testify, and of his hesitation on the stand in identifying his assailants
(R. 249: 18, 20, 23-26,46). Moreover, by explaining why he did what he did and the
timing of his actions, it also properly completed the story from the victim's point of view.
See State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113,1116-17 (Utah App. 1995) (finding it reasonable for
the jury to believe the victim's testimony that she delayed reporting out of a fear that
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jQ.

The Absence of Additional Witnesses To Corroborate Defendant's Alibi Was
A Matter Of Legitimate Trial Strategy
Defense counsel called Michelle Garcia as his sole witness to present an alibi: that

defendant was with Garcia and several other people during the afternoon, evening and
night of July 29, 1997, first at the courthouse, then at Garcia's house (R. 249: 93-101).
Defendant now faults his trial counsel for failing to develop the alibi defense through use
of additional witnesses, including himself. Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. In support, he points to
affidavits of Amanda Garay, Rosie Amaro, and himself, filed in support of the new trial
motion below, which noted the willingness of these individuals to testify at trial and the
general content of their proposed testimony (R. 177-85). IdL at 23. However, defendant
fails to establish that his counsel's decision not to call additional witnesses was anything
but a legitimate trial strategy. State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 1993) (so
long as this Court may articulate some plausible strategic explanation for counsel's
behavior, counsel will be assumed to have acted competently).
That defense counsel considered calling additional witnesses is clear from the
record. At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, the prosecutor noted that
defense counsel had told him that Rosie Amaro "just failed to show up for court11, which
is why defense counsel did not call her to testify (R. 255: 35). Add. B. Amanda Garay

defendant might retaliate against her or her children). Finally, the evidence countered
defendant's claim that the victim had a motive to lie about defendant's involvement. As
the prosecutor pointed out, if the victim had falsely or maliciously targeted defendant, he
would have wanted to actively pursue charges (R. 250: 237-38).

17

was present at trial and defense counsel identified her in his opening statement as one of
defendant's potential witnesses (R. 249: 175-76; 255: 35). Add. B. Counsel thereafter
chose not to call her, and later told the prosecutor that it was because "he was concerned
that she would contradict Michelle Garcia's testimony and by contradicting her
testimony, would dilute the value of Ms. Garcia's testimony." (R. 255: 35). Add. B.
Finally, defense counsel and defendant discussed the possibility of calling more witnesses
in an unrecorded conversation at the close of defendant's case (R. 249: 124-25). Defense
counsel then represented to the court that the defense would call no additional witnesses
and rested his case, offering no basis for his considered decision (id.). Defendant offered
no comment or objection and did nothing to suggest that he was acting solely on
counsel's recommendation but did not agree with his counsel's statement (id.).
In ruling on defendant's new trial motion, the trial court explained:
I do recall during the course of the trial that [defense counsel] indicated there was
a second witness [in addition to Ms. Garcia, who testified] that he would be calling
and that once Ms. Garcia testified, he changed his mind.
Now, I'm not part of his thinking process on that. I can only assume he
made that determination after listening to her [Ms. Garcia's] testimony and
knowing what he knew about the status of the evidence at that point. He didn't fail
to have other witnesses available, in fact, they were here and he made a
determination, after hearing Ms. Garcia testify, that he would not call the others.
I don't think any of that rises to the level of ineffective assistance of
counsel. I think he had a pre-conceived idea of how he wanted this case to go and
as I started out by saying, in hindsight, we may disagree with that. It was his
strategy and he had every opportunity to pursue that for [defendant's] benefit.
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(R. 255: 47). Add. B. Defendant points to no record evidence which contradicts the
memories of the prosecutor and the trial court that defense counsel had other witnesses
prepared to testify as to defendant's alibi.
Further, counsel's strategic decision not to call more witnesses is supported by the
discrepancies apparent on the face of those potential witnesses' affidavits. Comparison of
the affidavits reveals differences in the proposed testimony of all the defense witnesses
which the jury might have felt undermined the credibility of the alibi defense (copies of
the affidavits are attached in Add. D). Specifically:
-Garcia names at least three people who were together at the courthouse after the
Molina hearing who Garay does not mention (R. 177-78; 249: 96); Amaro
specifically says that one of those three was not present (R. 184);
-Garcia testified that five people left the courthouse in Amber Lloyd's car (R. 249:
97); Garay claims that five people left the courthouse in Garay's car (R. 178);
-Garcia testified twice that they left the courthouse at 5:30 or 5:45 p.m. (R. 249:
97-98, 117-18); Amaro claims that they left at 6:00 p.m. (R. 184);
-Amaro does not identify Garcia as being with the group at the courthouse after
the Molina hearing or with the group that left with defendant (R. 183-84).
These differences weaken the alibi defense by bringing into question the accuracy
of the alibi witnesses' memories, with Amaro's affidavit seriously undermining Garcia's
credibility by making no mention of her presence. These differences likely weighed
heavily in defense counsel's decision not to call further alibi witnesses in an attempt to
present the strongest alibi available.
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Finally, as the prosecutor pointed out during the new trial hearing, the witnesses
would have been open to cross-examination had they taken the stand (R. 255: 40). The
questioning would have included inquiries into each witness' relationship with defendant
and the Diamond Street gang to undermine their veracity and expose their biases (id.).7
The record suggests that counsel's decision not to call to the stand Anthony
Wallace-the attacker defendant saw-was also a matter of trial strategy. During trial,
defense counsel consulted with defendant before representing on the record that
defendant has decided not to call Anthony Wallace to the stand, indicating that counsel
was aware of the option and consciously chose not to exercise it (R. 249: 79). At the
hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, the prosecutor explained that had Wallace
been called to testify, the prosecutor was prepared to question Wallace and/or call
Detective Rich Montenez to the stand (R. 255: 35-36). Detective Montenez could testify
that Anthony Wallace told him that defendant had asked Wallace to lie about defendant
not being at the scene of the assault, and that Wallace was not anxious to perjure himself
when he testified (R. 255: 36). It is reasonable to believe under these facts that defense
counsel consciously chose to avoid the risks involved in having Wallace take the stand.
As for defendant's failure to testify, defendant has not demonstrated that his
counsel's decision fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was anything

7

The prosecutor revealed to the trial court that he believed Garay was defendant's
girlfriend and that some of the witnesses had long associations with Diamond Street,
although he did not expound upon what proof he might have elicited (R. 255: 37, 40).
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other than trial strategy. Defendant's brief claims only that he "was willing to testify at
trialf,]" not that he was prevented from doing so (Br. of Aplt at 23), and nothing in the
record suggests that he would have testified absent contrary advice from his counsel.
Defendant's affidavit additionally claims that his trial counsel did not "fairly
discuss[]" the reasons behind his advice that defendant not testify (R. 180). Add. D.
However, defense counsel consulted with defendant during trial immediately prior to
announcing that defendant would not be taking the stand (R. 255: 36). Defendant gave no
indication any time prior to the filing of the post-trial motion that he did not fully
understand or concur with his counsel's decision. This is insufficient to establish that
trial counsel performed deficiently. See State v. Newman. 928 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah
App. 1996) (the mere fact that defendant did not testify does not establish ineffective
assistance of counsel).
While the decision could have been made for any number of legitimate tactical
reasons, one of the more obvious ones would have been to avoid a potentially harmful
cross-examination of defendant. The record shows defendant to be a long-time gang
member with a history of confrontations with this victim (R. 155-56 [psi]; 249: 8, 15, 8387). Had he expressly denied his gang membership-as he has done in his pleadings-the
State was prepared to attack that testimony (R. 151, 155-56; 255: 37). On this record, it
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appears that defense counsel weighed the risks and made a reasoned determination that
the risks of having defendant testify outweighed the possible benefits.8
Ex

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply
Defendant's argument includes an assertion that the cumulative effect of his trial

counsel's deficient performance requires a new triaL Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. However,
because defendant has failed to establish any errors of counsel that prejudiced his right to
a fair trial, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516,
516 (Utah) (reRising to apply the cumulative error analysis where defendant failed to
establish any of his eight claims of ineffective assistance) (citing Bundv v. DeLand, 763

8

Defendant also fails to establish prejudice from his failure to testify. Defendant's
argument requires this Court to assess the probable impact of his likely testimony. See
State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996). His affidavit claims that he would
have testified Mas to [his] whereabouts and the fact that [he] was not involved in the
assault of Dino Hernandez." (R. 181). More specifically, he claims that he would have
testified that he "was not present at the scene of the assault of Dino Hernandez" (R. 180).
Add. D.
He does not, however, give sufficient detail of his proposed testimony to permit
this Court to assess its probable impact on the trial. For example, without further detail,
this Court cannot know whether his testimony would match the testimony of Michelle
Garcia, Amanda Garay, Rosie Amaro, or none of them. Even assuming his testimony
would have echoed Garcia's testimony, it would have been cumulative, and defendant
offers no basis for believing that the jury would have found him to be a credible witness
when it rejected Garcia's testimony. It would also have opened defendant up to crossexamination. Because defendant's claim of prejudice requires this Court to engage in
speculation, the claim does not represent the required "demonstrative reality," and it
necessarily fails. See Arguelles. 921 P.2d at 441: State v. Severance. 828 P.2d 1066,
1070 (Utah App. 1992).
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P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1988) (additional citations omitted), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966
(1994).
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF ERROR IN ADMISSION OF GANGRELATED EVIDENCE FAILS WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT
TRIAL COUNSEL INVITED ANY ERROR BY HIS PRE-TRIAL
AGREEMENT TO THE PARTIES' USE OF THE EVIDENCE
The first point in defendant's brief challenges the trial court's admission of all the
evidence relating to gangs, including the victim's and defendant's membership in rival
gangs and the relationship of gangs to the parties' actions.9 Br. of Aplt. at 10-19.
However, defendant fails to recognize the dispositive fact that the evidence was admitted
pursuant to the agreement of both parties below.
The "invited error" doctrine prevents a party from setting up or taking advantage
of an error at trial and then complaining of that error on appeal. State v. Stevenson, 884
P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995); State v.
Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, defendant's trial counsel
sought to admit gang-related evidence pertaining to the victim in order to challenge the
victim's veracity, and agreed to admission of the gang evidence related to defendant in
order to further his legitimate strategy (see Point I, supra for a discussion of the
defendant's claim appears to be based on rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence,
inasmuch as that is the sole rule recited by defendant both below and on appeal (R. 14954). Br. of Aplt. at 14. However, the exact basis of the claim is unimportant where the
claim is disposed of under the "invited error'1 doctrine.
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legitimacy of the strategy). Counsel discussed the agreement with the court prior to trial,
made no objection to gang-related voir dire questions, raised no objection to gang-related
evidence during trial, and actively used it in his examination and cross-examination of
witnesses and in his closing argument. Through his own actions, defendant's trial
counsel invited whatever error the trial court might otherwise have made in admitting the
evidence. Accordingly, the invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this issue.
Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205.
POINT HI
THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE PLACING
DEFENDANT AT THE SCENE OF THE ASSAULT AND ESTABLISHING
HIS CULPABILITY AS AN AIDER OR ABETTOR, IF NOT AS A
PRINCIPAL, IN THE OFFENSE
In his second point on appeal, defendant claims that he was found to be both
present at and guilty of the assault based solely on his association with the Diamond
Street gang. Br. of Aplt. at 18. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his
criminal responsibility, arguing that without the allegedly inadmissible gang-related
evidence, the remaining evidence established only his "possible" presence at the scene of
the assault. LI at 19-20. He claims that the only remaining evidence is third- and fourthparty hearsay evidence concerning the victim's pager lost at the scene of the assault, and
that this evidence is insufficient to establish defendant's presence. Id at 19. Defendant
claims that even if the pager evidence shows that he was present during the assault, it
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does not establish that he participated in or aided and abetted the assault.10 Id. at 19-20.
However, the evidence establishes more than defendant's mere presence at the scene and
is sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
On appeal, this issue is reviewed with great deference to the jury verdict. State v.
Jiron. 882 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1994). The evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Olsen, 869
P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994). "'Where there is any evidence, including reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime
can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the
verdict.'" Ikon, 882 P.2d at 691 (quoting State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah
1994)) (additional quotation omitted); see also State v. Hall. 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah
App. 1997). Reversal is not warranted unless the evidence is "so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime." Jiron. 882 P.2d at 691.
Additionally, defendant bears the burden of marshaling the evidence supporting
the jury's verdict and demonstrating how the evidence, and the reasonable inferences
therefrom, are insufficient to support the verdict. State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah

I0

Defendant does not contest that the victim was assaulted with a hard object, and
that the object did serious damage to the victim's head, requiring forty stitches. Further,
trial counsel conceded that serious bodily injury had occurred (R. 249: 174-75).
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App. 1994); State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994). As a threshold
matter, defendant has entirely failed to meet this burden. He notes that the non-gangrelated evidence consisted of testimony suggesting that defendant had the victim's pager
and the victim's voice identification of defendant which "indicated that the victim heard
Mr. Kandt talking and nothing more." Br. of Aplt. at 19-20. These assertions are wholly
insufficient to permit review of his claim on appeal. See State v. Galleeos. 851 P.2d
1185, 1189-90 (Utah App. 1993) ("Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's
right to have his claim of insufficiency considered on appeal."); State v. Peterson. 841
P.2d 21, 25 (Utah App. 1992) (no review of a claim of insufficient evidence for which
defendant made no attempt to marshal the evidence). Defendant's failure becomes clear
upon a review of the properly marshaled evidence.
There was no direct evidence that defendant himself struck a blow or wielded the
object which inflicted the serious bodily injury to the back of the victim's head.
However, defendant could still be found guilty of the aggravated assault under an aiding
and abetting theory. The jury instruction given in this case, which defendant does not
challenge on appeal, stated:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
the offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
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(R. 115). This instruction directly quotes Utah law that an agent, aider or abetter is as
culpable as a principal in the commission of a crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995)
(attached in Add. A); State v. McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982).
As with his other claims, defendant fails to acknowledge that the gang-related
evidence was admitted pursuant to the parties' agreement. See Points I and II, supra.
That evidence helped to support the victim's positive identification of defendant's voice,
placing defendant at the scene, and provided a likely motive for the assault.11 Defendant
claims that evidence of motive was irrelevant. Br. of Aplt. at 18. However, his trial
counsel found it important enough to develop and argue (R. 249: 31-43; 250: 226, 231,
233). Further, motive is often relevant to establishing a crime. State v. Pearson. 943 P.2d
1347, 1351 (Utah 1997) (approving admission of evidence which was relevant and
important to motive and intent); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1143-44 (Utah 1989)
(approving of admission of evidence that was relevant to establishing defendant's motive
to commit murder); Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (admission of evidence of "other crimes,
wrongs or acts" may be relevant to show "motive

M

).

Even assuming, arguendo, that the gang-related testimony should have been
omitted, defendant fails to acknowledge the evidence of the multiple prior confrontations
between himself and the victim, which explained, in part, why the victim was positive
H

The victim repeatedly reported that he was "jumped" and beaten by three people
(R. 249: 14-18, 25,45-46, 70). There was a lot of noise and confusion, a lot of yelling
and screaming, and he heard defendant's voice (R. 249: 17-18, 29-30).
27

about his voice identification and provided a motive for the assault. This evidence can be
explained without any mention of gang involvement, making it a valid consideration for
the jury in any event.
At one point in the trial, the victim implied that defendant retrieved the victim's
pager at the assault scene and later called various friends of the victim bragging about
who he was and the assault on the victim (R. 249: 19, 23). Defendant minimizes the
importance of this testimony, claiming that it was "third and fourth party hearsay"
supporting only the claim that he was present at the assault. Br. of Aplt. at 19. He does
not, however, challenge the admission of the testimony. This information not only
suggests defendant's presence at the assault, but his willingness to be recognized as being
part of the event, suggesting that he possessed the same intent as the others who were
present.
There was additional evidence placing defendant's car at the scene of the assault
and suggesting that defendant drove the trio to the Pizza Hut. Detective Howell testified
that defendant owned a gray-silver or silver-gray car around the time of the assault (R.
249: 83-85), and Melissa Koontz testified that near the time of the assault, she noticed a
blue-gray car drive to the Pizza Hut and three men get out, two of whom were blacks
(Dino positively identified his other attackers as two black members of Diamond Street;
defendant is white) (R. 249: 62-63,66-67, 89). As the trio did nothing except attack Dino
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and leave, the jury could reasonably believe that their only purpose for being at the Pizza
Hut was to attack Dino.
The jury credited the evidence establishing that defendant was present at the
assault. Nothing in the evidence provides any basis for the jurors to reasonably believe
that defendant did anything other than encourage, if not participate in, the assaultive acts
of the others. Nothing suggests that one of the three was hesitant in approaching Dino,
tried to stop the others' attack, tried to warn Dino or help him, or in any manner
attempted to terminate his participation in the event. Even defendant failed to suggest
such an interpretation of the evidence, instead urging the jury to believe that he was not
even present. Even if the jury concluded that defendant did nothing more than drive the
car, stand "lookout," watch as the others assaulted Dino, took Dino's pager, then bragged
about the assault to others, the jury could reasonably find defendant guilty of aiding and
abetting. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) (establishing guilt if a defendant encourages
or intentionally aides another's criminal conduct with the requisite intent); State v.
Murphv. 26 Utah 2d 330, 489 P.2d 430,432 (1971) (defendant was a "principal" where
he drove a codefendant to a jewelry store, waited in the car while the codefendant robbed
the store and killed the store owner, then drove the codefendant away).
The evidence established that all three individuals intentionally aided and
encouraged, if not actively participated in, the assault, whether it be by using their feet
and fists or by yelling their encouragement to the others. When properly marshaled and
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viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there was sufficient evidence from
which the jury could convict defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

7

day of March, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

7
KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

76-2-2C2. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-2-202.
Cross-References. — Aiding violation of

Wildlife Resources Code, J 23-20-23.
Obstructing justice, ft 76-8-306.

76-3-203.1

CRIMINAL CODE

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-203.1. OiTenses committed by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.

(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate ofTense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.

(1) (a) A person who commits any ofTense listed in Subsection (4) in concert
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the ofTense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for
the ofTense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
ofTense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the ofTense in concert with two or more persons,
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are:
(a) If the ofTense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the ofTense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the ofTense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the ofTense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the ofTense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the ofTense is a capital ofTense for which a life sentence is imposed,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robl>ery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
64

History: C 1953,76-3-203.1, enacted by L.
1990, c h . 207, S 1; 1994, c h . 12, t 108.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

76-3-203.1

ment, effective May 2, 1994, corrected the reference in Subsection (lXa).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
of the enhanced penalty as it was obliged to do
under this section, failure of defendant to object
to the enhancement precluded consideration of
the issue on appeal. State v. Labrum, 246 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

ANALYSIS

Findings or fact.
Mental state of parties.
Findings of fact.
Even though the trial court did not make
written findings offset concerning applicability

Mental atate of parties.
For this section to apply, a defendant must
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76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
(lXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, $ 10;
1989, ch. 170, § 2; 1995, ch. 291, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendroent, effective May 1, 1995, added "under
circumstances not amounting to a violation of

Subsection (lXa)" to the beginning of Subsection (1Kb); substituted "A violation of Subsection (lMa)" for "Aggravated assault" and "second degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2);
and added Subsection (3).
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11

future threats and not to go into that.
And then the witnesses, including Mr. Kandt,
could cone forward and testify and the very weak evidence
offered by the State could—could be held under scrutiny
of the due process of a fair trial, which didn't occur at
the last proceedings.
And we would respectfully ask the Court to
grant the notion for a new trial.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Castle, would you like to respond?
MR. CASTLE:

I would, your Honor.

12

Your Honor, from the State's perspective, the

13

standard in which you need to judge whether a new trial
I should be awarded is based on the standards articulated

15

I in Strickland vs. Washington.

16

' referred to that case, but did not refer to the standards

17

I the Court articulated in terms of whether a new trial

18
19

I know Mr. Gaither

should be awarded in this particular case.
And before I talk about those standards, your

20

Honor, I know that Mr. Gaither in his argunent has

21

outlined his argunent in—in terns of there was evidence

22

that was offered that should have been objected to that

23

prejudiced ny client. And then he talks about how

24

counsel was ineffective and, your Honor, fron ny

25

perspective, really, they're one and the sane.

27

The question to be asked is whether or not Mr.
Angerhofer was ineffective in his assistance of Mr* Kandt
during this trial.
Going back to the test articulated in
Strickland vs. Washington, there are two prongs; one
prong being, did counsel's performance fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness and whether
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.

And Mr.

Kandt actually is required to satisfy both of those
standards and I would submit at this point, they—they
have not in any way satisfied those standards,
particularly, number one, they can't even get past the
first hurdle.
And as indicated in Strickland vs. Washington,
a strong presumption that defense—there is a strong
presumption against defense counsel's conduct falling
outside of the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.

This court will not second guess trial

counsel's legitimate, strategic choices, however flawed
those choices might appear in retrospect.
And in stating that standard, your Honor, I
need to go back to the trial and some conversations we
had in your chambers, conversations we had with the jury
was voir dired.
Your Honor, you'll recall that prior to the

28

1

trial starting, me and Mr. Angerhofer met with you in

2

your chambers.

3

discuss this very issue about gang membership and what to

4

do about that.

5

The purpose of that meeting was to

And the reason for that is because it was clear

6

and I never contested the issue, that Mr. Dino Hernandez

7

was a gang member.

8

Posse and he was a rival gang member of Diamond Street.

9

He was a gang member of Salt Lake

The reason that was important to Mr. Angerhofer

10

is because, for him, that was a source of impeachment

11

which he could pursue against Mr. Hernandez. He's a

12

rival gang member, he's biased, he has a motive for

13

dragging Mr. Kandt into this legal process. And Mr.

14

Angerhofer recognized that.

15

But what's good for the goose is good for the

16

gander, your Honor, and that's really why we were talking

17

about gang membership.

18

If Mr. Angerhofer was going to

[ cross-examine Mr. Hernandez on his gang membership and

19

why he might be less than truthful, then it was only fair

20

that the State have the opportunity to explore the fact

21

that Mr. Kandt was—was a member of Diamond Street, which

22

is a rival gang.

23

And my opening statement and maybe you'll

24

recall that, would never have been given the way I gave

25

it had we not had that agreement.

29

And my opening

statement, the fact there were no objections/ represents
the agreement we had, I had with Mr. Angerhofer, the
agreement we talked about with the Court in your
chambers.

The questions that I asked Mr. Hernandez were

questions asked based on that agreement, and that
agreement is evidenced by the fact that I asked those
questions and those questions were not objected to.
Now, one thing I did in the trial in terms of a
trial tactic is, I brought out right from the beginning
Mr. Hernandez' gang affiliation.

The reason I did that

was simply to get it out of the gate before Mr.
Angerhofer did.

That was a trial tactic on my part. And

in terms of the gang information that was provided, but
also as part of Mr. Angerhofer's trial strategy.
There's absolutely been no evidence, no
argument made that somehow, his trial strategy falls
below that reasonable professional assistance standard
articulated in Strickland ygt Washington*

This was part

of his trial strategy.
I know in Mr. Gaither's brief, he indicated
that, particularly in his reply brief, that the reason
Mr. Angerhofer did what he did on cross-examination,
meaning bringing up the gang association, bringing up the
fact that Mr. Hernandez had been with a fellow gang
member when they threw a lug nut through Mr. Kandt's
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1
2
3
4
5

window is because I started it. Well, that's not the
truth at all.

It was something that was agreed on in the

beginning, it was part of Mr. Angerhofer's trial strategy
that for—the way for him to impeach Mr. Hernandez, to
question his motive, to question his bias, was to bring

6

out the fact he was a gang member and was a rival gang

7

member.

8
9

Your Honor, in terms of some of these other
questions that I asked Mr. Hernandez about his house

10

being shot up, it had to do with his reluctance to be a

11

witness in Court.

12

required to be here, yes, he didn't have a choice but we

13

know a witness can take the stand and say, I'm just not

14

talking and the Court can hold that person in contempt

15

for a 30-day period and that's the only penalty imposed

16

upon that person.

17

The fact that he was subpoenaed and

What I was attempting to show the jury is that

18

there are legitimate reasons why Mr. Hernandez didn't

19

want to testify.

20

that he was hand served, that was the beginning.

21

beginning of the fact that in his own mind, he faced some

22

real dangers by coming to Court and testifying.

23

though he's a rival gang member, he is violating a code

It just didn't have to do with the fact
The

Even

24

of conduct among all gang members about coming to court

25

and about testifying.
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4

'

And the reason the question was asked about his
home is because he had made the statement to the police,

| I'm telling you this story about what happened, I just
want you to watch my house but I don't want to do

5

anything about this, I don't want to pursue it. And your

6

Honor, the person who pursued this case was me.

7

the one that decided not to give Mr. Hernandez a choice

8

and I think I was entitled to ask him those questions

9

I that demonstrated his reluctance, why he didn't want to

10

come.

11
12

I was

Z mean we act like somehow this event occurred
I in some sterile environment and it didn't.

It occurred

13

because Mr. Hernandez and his friend, whether it was Mr.

14

Hernandez or his friend, threw that lug nut through Mr.

15

I Kandt's window and Mr. Kandt was back to retaliate.

16

is part of the gang culture, that's part of the gang

17

conduct.

18
19

That

And under Rule 404(b)* I'm entitled to offer
I evidence about motive. And what I was also trying to

20 I present in this case and that'* why it was relevant is
21

I the motive that Mr. Kandt had in performing this assault

22

I on Mr. Hernandez. And that's why that testimony was

23

offered, because Mr. Kandt, from the State's perspective

24

had a motive and that was one of retaliation.

25

Your Honor, you'll recall we spent a lot of
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2
3
4

tine with the jury prior to empaneling one, asking
questions about gang affiliation, gang membership,
whether or not that would affect their ability to make a
decision based on just the facts of the case and those

5

that admitted that they could not, we eliminated those

6

from the jury pool.

7
8
9

And I bring that up again because, your Honor,
that's further evidence that we had an agreement, me and
Mr. Angerhofer, with the Court, that we would be talking

10

about gang membership.

11

in the case, but it was also part of Mr. Angerhofer's

12

strategy.

That it was part of my strategy

13

Now, I know Mr. Gaither, in looking at the

14

transcript that he provided to me, does not have the

15

information about the voir dire of the jury and it's

16

evident that he hasn't talked to Mr. Angerhofer either,

17

because had he had the portion of the voir dire

18

transcribed, he would have seen that we spent quite a bit

19

of time and you'll remember this, in talking with the

20

jury about gang membership; in fact, during the voir dire

21

of the jury, we had a fight outside with rival gang

22

| members. And there was inquiry into that, whether that

23

I was going to affect the ability of the jurors to be

24

' objective, be unbiased and be fair in terms of hearing

25

I the—the testimony.
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I know that we were concerned about whether
that had affected them and we—we discovered that no, it
had not, that they were not aware of that fight that had
occurred outside.
So, your Honor, going back to that first
standard of Strickland, I would submit that what Mr.
Angerhofer did was part of his trial strategy.

That's

why gang membership issues came up because that was also
part of his strategy, that's why he did not object.
So we're really not talking about whether Mr.
Angerhofer should have objected, we're not really talking
about whether these were errors that were committed that
you need to look at as a whole and decide whether Mr.
Kandt was given a fair trial, because that was part of
Mr. Angerhofer's strategy.
That's the question.

That's the standard.

Does it fall below the objective standard of reasonable
assistance?

That's the standard we're looking at. And I

would submit, your Honor, that it—it doesn't, that Mr.
Kandt has not, in any way, shown that what Mr. Angerhofer
did falls below that standard.
I mean it's easy now to look back, after Mr.
Kandt was convicted and say, oh, wait a minute. My
defense counsel didn't do his job; but as the courts have
said, as said in Strickland vs. Washington. State Y&JU
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1
2
3

Tennesonr the Court can't second guess legitimate trial
tactics, even if—even if they look flawed at this point
in the proceeding.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Your Honor, with respect to the additional
witnesses that Mr. Gaither indicates that Mr. Kandt would
have called, now, in retrospect; Amanda (inaudible), your
Honor, it should be noted that she was here for the trial
and present and identified as one of Mr. Kandt's
witnesses during the trial. But her affidavit,
interestingly enough, contradicts Ms. Garcia's testimony
about who left in which car and where they went.

12
13

I should also mention that Mr. Angerhofer
represented to me the reason he was not calling her is
because he was concerned that she would contradict
I Michelle Garcia's testimony and by contradicting her

16

testimony, would dilute the value of Ms. Garcia's

17

testimony.

18

As to Rosie Armaro, your Honor, Mr. Angerhofer

19

represented to me that she just failed to show up for

20

court.

21
22

That's why he didn't call her.
As to Anthony Wallace, there was reference in

I the memorandum as to that.

You'll recall that Mr.

23

Angerhofer, after consulting with Mr. Kandt, represented

24

on the record that they had decided not to call him.

25

Mr. Wallace been called, I would have called Detective

35

Had

Rich Montenez, your Honor. Mr. Montenez informed me
during the trial that Mr. Wallace had indicated to him
that Mr. Kandt had asked him to lie about him being at
the Pizza Hut when this assault occurred and that Mr.
Wallace was relieved he didn't have to be called because
he would have perjured himself.
As to Mr. Kandt, there was also discussion and
it can be seen on the videotape that Mr. Angerhofer had
with Mr. Kandt and that a representation made to the
court by Mr. Angerhofer that Mr. Kandt wouldn't testify.
And you know# for Mr. Kandt, it's not as easy
as he thinks it is. His testimony wouldn't be restricted
just to that affidavit he's filed with this case, I'd
have the opportunity to cross-examine, I'd have the
opportunity to cross-examination on each little motive
and that's related to his gang membership.

I would have

the opportunity to cross-examine him on bias, that's
related to his gang membership.

I'd be able to do all

that because I would be able to cross-examine on his
veracity.
And Mr. Kandt can't have his cake and eat it
too.

He can't get up there and think he's not going to

be asked those questions, when they're very relevant to
his motive, to his bias and what he has become here in
this valley, he is a gang member.

36

And had Mr. Kandt been

1
2
3

called, as well as these other witnesses, your Honor, sty
strategy would have been different in terms of how I
would have handled then.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

In fact, what would have happened, Mr. Howe's
testimony, Mr. Fritz' testimony would have been even more
relevant had Mr. Kandt taken the testimony (sic) and
denied his membership and somehow tried to tell the jury
the reason he has Diamond Street tattooed all over his
body is because his first name is Denny.
of baloney.

That's a bunch

He has that, tattoos on his body because

he's a member of Diamond Street; in fact, the information

12 I
13 I the State has is that he is one of the leaders of Diamond
14
15

Street.
Your Honor, this case was based on the

16

testimony of Dino Hernandez, but it was based on the

17

testimony of an uncooperative witness, the State will

18

admit that, and the State will admit that Mr. Hernandez

19

gave several different stories.

20

He gave one story to the police.

He gave one

21

story at the preliminary hearing.

22

slightly different story at trial and that's why

23

Detective Fritz was called, your Honor, to testify as to

24

what Dino was telling him shortly after the incident
occurred. When's his testimony going to be most reliable

25

He gave another

or in terms of remembering what happened, it'll be most
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1

reliable shortly after the event occurred.

2
3

And your Honor, under Rule 613 of the Rules of
Evidence, the State is allowed to bring other witnesses

4

in where one witness has made a statement to that witness

5

and then on the stand either doesn't remember it or

6

denies making that statement, and the reason Detective

7

Fritz was called to the stand was to testify as to what

8

Dino had said before.

9

its own witness and through the use of Detective Fritz,

10

The State's allowed to impeach

what the State was doing was simply corroborating what
I Mr. Hernandez had said before.

12

And in terms of identification, voice as well

13

as a face, is good enough.

14

To identify someone by the sound of their voice or by the

15

That's competent evidence.

fact that he saw him.

16

And I should indicate, your Honor, that Mr.

17

I Hernandez indicated at the preliminary hearing, that it

18

was Denny Kandt, there was no question in his mind at

19

that point, that's what he told the police officers and

20

then when he got to trial, he did what he did with Mr.

21

Lopez during the preliminary hearing and that is, you

22

know, I just remember a voice, I don't remember a face.

23
24
25

Your Honor, Mr. Hernandez was not a cooperative
witness.

He was a witness up there trying to minimize

what might happen to him for testifying and the case that

38

I put forth to the jury was an effort to corroborate the
fact that this event occurred, that Mr. Kandt was
involved with Mr. Lopez and Mr. Wallace, that they were
guilty of an aggravated assault because they used some
dangerous weapon.

It's true, we didn't ever figure out

really what it was, whether it was a rock or something
else; but the whole reason I called in the Pizza Hut
fellow was to indicate as corroborative evidence of the
nature of the injury that Mr. Hernandez suffered.
Your Honor, we also had a young woman testify
about seeing three people, two of which were black. Mr.
Lopez and Mr. Wallace, as established during the trial,
are both black.

There was also discussions about a car,

a car similar in color as well as similar in size to Mr.
Kandt.

That was testified to by Detective Howe as well

as this other civilian witness.
Your Honor, as to this area of argument Mr.
Gaither has indicated on the issue of being a snitch,
he's guessing as to why you asked me to move on.
know why you asked me to move on.

I don't

It's not because—

based on what you said later, it was because I could not
ask that question and you simply instructed me to ask
that at a different time.

I don't think that was that

you were indicating somehow that was improper, but simply
directing me to do it later on if I so chose to do.
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1

Your Honor, with respect, going back to the

2

witnesses that Mr. Kandt wished he would have called,

3

your Honor, all of those witnesses could have been cross-

4

examined based on bias, motive to lie, motive to be here

5

for Mr. Kandt.

6

associated with Mr. Kandt.

7

they are associates of his gang.

8

issue, a unique issue for cross-examination because it

9

goes back to what I said a couple times, I said a couple

All of them except for Rosie are
They're not just his friends,
That presents a unique

10

of times during the trial as well as today; there is a

11

code of conduct among gang members that's unique to that

12 I
' | association and the State at least would have petitioned
13

' the Court for the opportunity to cross-examine them on
their bias, that being their association with Diamond
15
I Street gang members including Mr. Kandt and my
16

17

understanding is that Amanda Gurule was and still might

18

be Mr. Kandt's girlfriend.

19

So to say that somehow these witnesses would

20

have changed the outcome is simply speculative based on

21

the fact that their affidavits are inconsistent with Mr.-

22

-with Ms. Garcia's testimony and the fact that Anthony

23

Wallace had admitted to Detective Rich Montenez what the

24
25

plan was in terms of his testimony.
I
Your Honor, I'd ask the Court to deny the
motion. Mr. Kandt has not satisfied either of the two
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1
2
3

standards required under Strickland vs. Washington and
the Utah case law concerning trial strategy.

this simply was, trial strategy on Mr. Angerhofer's part.

4
5
6
7
8
9

He took advantage of the fact that Mr*
Hernandez was a gang member both on cross-examination as
well as in his closing argument, that this was something
motivated simply because of the rivalry between the two
groups•
And would ask that you deny the motion.

10
11

THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Gaither, your rebuttal?

12
13

That's what

MR. GAITHER:

Thank you.

I would submit that the statements made by the

14

prosecutor concerning Mr. Kandt and that he has become

15

and is known as a gang member and that he is believed by

16

some to be a leader of a certain gang essentially again

17

indicates the approach taken by the prosecution in this

18

case and I would submit the—the real issues were lost by

19

this gang evidence.

20

The fact that Mr. Kandt's vehicle, he would

21

have testified that the color of his vehicle wasn't the

22

color that was observed by these persons; the fact that

23

he was just not there, he was not present and did not—

24
25

I couldn't have participated in—in this assault of Dino
Hernandez.
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1
2
3

evidence that the State has, requires that this natter
be—that my client be awarded a new trial and we would
request that, your Honor.

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

5

MR. GAITHER:

6

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Counsel, I had an

7

opportunity to review your memos before the hearing today

8

and I appreciate receiving those and having an

9

opportunity to do so.

10

Based upon my review of the memoranda and also

11

your argument, I'm going to deny the motion for a new

12

trial.

13

While in hindsight the things that former

14

counsel did might have appeared to have been mistaken

15

strategy, I think it very clearly was part of his trial

16

strategy; in other words, that the victim was a gang

17

member who was assaulted by rival gang members but we

18

weren't there.

19

And in fact, that was said in conversation

20

between counsel and I.

21

the proceedings it was, it may have been when we were

22

discussing witnesses or it may have been during voir dire

23

process or at some other point, but that was raised

24

because counsel both made it clear to me that part of the

25

defendant's trial strategy was to allow that evidence in

I don't recall at what stage of
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1
2

because their defense was he wasn't there, so it didn't
really matter.

3
4
5

It also appears to me that had that not been
part of the trial strategy, much of that clearly went to
motive, to explain an otherwise unexplainable assault.

6

In terms of the witnesses who did not testify,

7

there was one witnesses—one witness, I believe, Ms.

8

Garcia, who did testify for Mr. Kandt.

9

specifically her testimony.

I don't recall

I do recall during the

10

course of the trial that Mr. Angerhofer indicated there

11

was a second witness that he would be calling and that

12

once Ms. Garcia testified, he changed his mind.

13

Now, I'm not part of his thinking process on

14

that.

15

listening to her testimony and knowing what he knew about

16

the status of the evidence at that point.

17

to have other witnesses available, in fact, they were

18

here and he made a determination, after hearing Ms.

19

Garcia testify, that he would not call the others.

20

I can only assume he made that determination after

He didn't fail

I don't think any of that rises to the level of

21

ineffective assistance of counsel.

22

conceived idea of how he wanted this case to go and as I

23

started out by saying, in hindsight, we may disagree with

24

that.

25

to pursue that for Mr. Kandt's benefit.

I think he had a pre-

It was his strategy and he had every opportunity
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1

And so based upon all of that, the motion for a

2

new trial is denied.

3

I'm going to ask Mr. Castle to prepare an order

4

consistent with that.

5

Is there anything else that we need to address

6

today that you're aware of, Counsel?

7

MR. CASTLE:

Your Honor, in Mr.

8

Gaither's memorandum, he did bring up the issue of the

9

group enhancement.

10

I simply raise that because it was in

his memo.

11

Z know we talked about it at the time of

12

sentencing, we talked about it at the time the verdict

13

was rendered, but there it is again.

14

what you want to do with it, I don't know what Mr.

15

Gaither wants—

16

THE COURT:

17

So I don't know

I've already made my

ruling.

18

MR. CASTLE:

19

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr.

20
21

22

23

Okay.

Gaither?
I

MR. GAITHER:

Your Honor, nothing

else.
That—that issue was raised because we didn't

24

want to indicate there was any waiver of the objections

25

that were made and I would incorporate the objections and
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1

subpoenaed here to tell you what has happened.

2

the law is such that when there is a violation of the

3

law, the person who's violated the law, has to answer for

4

the consequences.

5

Because

After all the evidence has been presented, I

g

will return here and speak to you again and when I do

j

that, I'm going to ask you to carefully consider all of

8

the evidence that you've heard and base your decision

g

just on that evidence, base your decision just on the law
that the Court has given you, to set aside any bias you

10

11 might have in considering that evidence, and when I
^2 I return, I will be asking you to find Denny Kandt guilty
13

I of aggravated assault, and that's what he's been charged

14

I with.

15

I

16

I struck Dino Hernandez in the head with this object or

17

18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

He's been charged with either being the one who

being someone that was there, who was aiding and
abetting others to do the same.
Thank you,
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Castle.

And Mr. Angerhofer, do you wish to make an
opening statement at this time?
MR. ANGERHOFER:

Yes, please.

May it please the Court, learned Counsel,
ladies and gentlemen of the jury.
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The prosecution has

1

painted a pretty grim picture of the crime—or the gang

2 I scene in Salt Lake City and I'm not here to dispute that,
3

I'm not—this case today is not about cleaning up the

4

streets of Salt Lake, getting rid of the gang problem.

5

That's not the issue and that's not going to happen any

6

time soon.

j

If that was the case, it would be really easy

8

to solve our gang problem in Salt Lake; however, you'll

g

remember, as the Judge asked you as we were selecting you

10

for the jury, if you could independently, impartially and

11

without bias, reach a decision in this case after

12

considering all of the evidence and not being influenced

13

one way or the other by the mention of whether witnesses

14

or the defendant are members of a gang.

15

issue here, being a member of a gang is not a crime.

16

Aggravated assault, however, is a crime.

That is not the

And with that, the State has to show two things

17

18

beyond a reasonable doubt:

19

in other words, that the victim was assaulted, that he

20

sustained injuries. We don't dispute that, the medical

21

evidence will show that he did in fact require stitches,

22

he was taken to the hospital.

25

There's no dispute there.

What this case focuses on, though, is who did

23
24

That a crime was committed,

it?

Who inflicted the wound?

Hernandez?

Who assaulted Dino

That is what we're asking you to do here
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«l

today.

2

Listen to the evidence—you'll hear conflicting

3

evidence, by the way.

4

each person that testifies, I would ask that you consider

5

their credibility, consider what they have to say and ask

6

particularly if they're telling the truth, for when you

7

go back into the jury room, you'll be asked to weigh

3

everything that you've heard today and come to a

g

conclusion, guilt or innocence of this defendant.

JO

Juries often do.

As you listen to

Not whether or not a crime has been committed,

jj

not whether Dino has sustained an injury, we know that.

J2

Not whether or not the gang problem exists in Salt Lake,

j3

We know that.

14

defendant, witness or whoever is a member of a gang.

15

We

know that, and that's not an issue, that's not a crime.
What we have to ask, though, as you listen to

16
17

Not whether any particular member, the

the evidence, it will show that the defendant, Denny, was

18

not present at the crime scene on the day this crime

19

occurred.

20

around 5:30, 6;00 o'clock p.m. at the Pizza Hut.

21

been well established, it'll come out today, you'll see

22

the evidence before it.

23
24
25

This crime occurred o n — o n July 28th, 1997,
That's

But you'll also find evidence, Michelle Garcia,
a friend of Denny's, Amanda Garay, a friend of Denny's,
they were both here with Denny at the courthouse on that
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^

day, between 3:00 o'clock and 5:30 p.m.

From 5:30 p.m.,

2

all three of them went to Michelle's and Amanda's house,

3

watched a movie called Happy Gilmore. And you believe or

4

not believe.

5

They didn't get out~then~then Denny had to go

6

home, it's 10:00, 10:30 at night, she left, and Denny was

j

not out of their sight from about 3:00 o'clock in the

8

afternoon until about 10:30 at night.

g

occurred at 5:30—and by the way, the evidence will show

10

that the defendant—or the victim, rather, Dino, checked

11

in to L.D.S. Hospital about 6:40 p.m. on the 28th; so,

12

some time between 5:30 p.m. to 6:40 p.m., he was

13

assaulted, went to the hospital, got his treatment.

14

Denny was nowhere near, the evidence will show he was

15

some place else.
Well, now, wait a minute, you say, how can that

16
17

Well, if the crime

be?

Already we have a conflict.

The victim's going to

18

be saying that Denny did it to him.

19

be saying, No, he was with us all the time.

20

telling a lie here and that's what you'll be asked to

21

listen to today as you listen to every single witness who

22

gets on that witness stand, look at them, use all of your

23

experience of human nature concerning truth or lie, as

24

each witness is on that stand and ask, Who's telling the

25

truth here?

Who's telling a lie?
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Denny's friends will
Somebody is

1

What motivation would anyone have to tell the

2

truth here or a lie?

3

Dino testified under oath at a prior hearing and at that

4

prior hearing, he admitted to being a gang member, he

5

admitted prior confrontations with Denny, in which a

6

friend of the victim, a friend of Dino's, threw a rock

7

through—at Denny's house.

8
g

Well, the evidence will show that

Dino, the victim, will testify that he held a
grudge against Denny.

Consider that and consider—ask

10 motivation when Dino gets on the stand.
H

telling us the things you're saying?

12

testimony.

Listen to his

The evidence will show that as Dino checked

13
14

Why are you

into the hospital, he told one story.

He said that prior

15 gang members were trying to get him back into a gang that
1g I he used to belong to but no longer was in the gang. That
17

was the day of the assault.
Two days later, the evidence will indicate that

18
19

Dino was talking to a Detective Vu and a Detective

20

Rivera.

21
22
23
24
25

He told them—let me get it right here, 'cause

it changes it here—he will tell him—he told two days
later that Dino, the victim, threw the first punch at a
Mr. Lopes and then Mr. Lopes hits him with the rock.
And then about five days later, on August 5th,
Dino, the victim, states to a Detective Thomas this time,
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1

a different detective, but within the weak, that Anthony

2

Wallace threw the first swing at him and that again, it

3

was Lopes that hit him.

4

At the only time which he's put under oath at a

5

prior hearing, Dino, the victim, will say he doesn't know

6

who hit him with a rock.

7

I

So, we have at least three, maybe four

8

different stories.

As you listen to whatever story Dino

9

tells today, ask yourself, motivation and whether or not

10

he's telling the truth or lying, for that is critical.

11

We have opposing stories here, contradicting stories.

12

Your job is to determine who's telling the truth.

13

I

Thank you.
THE COURT:

14

15

Thank you, Mr.

Angerhofer.
Mr. Castle, will you call your first witness.

17

I

MR. CASTLE:
Dino Hernandez.

18

THE COURT:

19

Will you come forward,

please, to where my clerk is and I'll ask her to

20

administer the oath.

21
22

Thank you, your Honor.

J

23
24 minutes?
„_ I

(Further proceedings previously transcribed.)
THE COURT:

MR. CASTLE:
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Get on and off in 20

Could I approach the
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RANDALL GAITHER, #1141
Attorney for DENNY DUKE KANDT
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)531-1990

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIVISION I
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF AMANDA GARAY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT,
DENNY DUKE KANDT

:

vs.
DENNY DUKE KANDT,
Defendant.

:

Judge PEULER

::

Case No. 971901021 FS

State Of Utah

)
:ss
County Of Salt Lake )
I, AMANDA GARAY, being first duly sworn upon my oath deposes and states as
follows:
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and I am employed at the
Salt Lake County Recorders Office.
2. I know and am acquainted with Denny Kandt.
3. On July 28,1997,1 was in Court in the Third Judicial District Court and
Denny Kandt was present at the hearing.
1

4. After Court, Amber Lloyd, Anabell Martinez, Denny Kandt and I talked with
Mr. Molina's mother outside the Third Judicial District Court courtroom for a
considerable period of time. Then Denny Kandt, Amber Lloyd and Anabell Martinez left
in my Mercury Sable and left for Michelle Garcia's residence.
5. Myself, Michelle Garcia, Amber Lloyd, Anabell Martinez and Denny Kandt
/went from Court directly to Michelle AMANDA GARAY's house in the Rose Park area
of Salt Lake City.
6. After leaving the residence we watched a video and played Monopoly. We
played Monopoly until about 10:00 p.m. or 10:30 p.m. During this time, Denny Kandt
was present either at Salt Lake District Court, in the car or at the residence and never left
to go to any other location in Salt Lake County. ^ ? / / ^ ^ ' >

/ ^ / ^ X ^ ^

/A/d/uaW? JOclttl?'* ?/<#*'** cyq.
7. I was willing to testify if called as a witness on behalf of Denny Kandt and I
am still willing to testify to the fact that Denny Kandt could not have been at the place
where Mr. Hernandez was assaulted.
8. I was present at the trial but was not called to testify.

n

DATED this / 1 day of January, 1998.

JWANDA GARAY
OAR AY
AMANDA

State Of Utah

)
:ss

0

7

"

County Of Salt Lake )
On the _J_Zpay of January, 1998, personally appeared before me, AMANDA
GARAY, having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true
according to the best of information and belief and has executed the same.

Rotary "Seal:

^"8® £$^""1

Notary \Public

I,
. •-, _ 321 South600East
I
II
-iH Sfi'La*^ City. Utah 84121 !
! \ .v .-S//J
My Commistion Expire* I

FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of January, 1998, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT was faxed/mailed First Class, postage prepaid to:
CYH. CASTLE
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
DATED this.

H.

day of January, 1998.

3

RANDALL GAITHER, #1141
Attorney for DENNY DUKE KANDT
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)531-1990

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIVISION I
STATE OF UTAH,

::
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNY KANDT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT,
DENNY DUKE KANDT

::

vs.

:

DENNY DUKE KANDT,

:

Judge PEULER

::

Case No. 971901021 FS

Defendant.

State Of Utah

)
:ss

County Of Salt Lake )
I, Denny Duke Kandt, being first duly sworn upon my oath deposes and states as
follows:
1. I am the Defendant in the above entitled matter.
2. I was willing to testify in my defense and if I had been called to the stand, I
would have testified that I was not present at the scene of the assault of Dino Hernandez.
3. I do not believe that my appointed counsel fairly discussed with me the reasons
why he advised me not to testify at Trial. I was willing to testify before the jury and
1

subject myself to cross examination by the Prosecution.
4. If a new Trial is ordered in this matter I would testify as to my whereabouts and
the fact that I was not involved in the assault of Dino Hernandez.
5. I do not believe that my prior attorney effectively developed my alibi defense
and I, along with my father, had given him information as to other witnesses who I
believe would have supported each other's testimony to corroborate the fact that I was
not present and did not participate in the assault.
6. I request that the Court grant a new trial in this matter.
DATED this

( I day of January, 1998.

JW^A^CT

l5ENNY£tjKEKANDT
State Of Utah

)
:ss

County Of Salt Lake )
On the

day of January, 1998, personally appeared before me, Denny Duke

Kandt, having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true
according to the best of information and belief and has executed the same.

Notary Seal:
mmmmtm

fP ~ZSL~IT

wctarv Public _
!
RANDMX GAITHEH
I
!/>^2wft
321 South 600 East
|
1
- & * M )!1 Salt Lake City. Utah,84121 ,

I /sSSkv

Notar^Public/

FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

t

eh

/ day of January, 1998, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT was faxed/mailed First Class, postage prepaid to:
CYH. CASTLE
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
DATED this.

H

day of January, 1998.

3

RANDALL GAITHER, #1141
Attorney for DENNY DUKE KANDT
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)531-1990

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIVISION I
STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSIE AMARO
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT,
DENNV m TKF K AMT^T

Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNY DUKE KANDT,

Judge PEULER

Defendant.
State Of Utah

Case No. 971901021 FS

)

:ss

County Of Salt Lake )
. . AMARO, being first duly sworn upon my oath deposes and states as

1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and reside at the address of
1407 Utah Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.

3. On July 28,1997, my son, Armando Molina, was sentenced i
Third Judicial District Court and Denny Kandt was present at the hearing and was
1

present with me and other people in Court.
4. After Court, Amanda Garay, Amber Lloyd, Laura Vasquez and Denny Kandt
and others talked with me outside the Third Judicial District Court courtroom for a
considerable period of time after court finished at about 5:30 p.m.. I then observed
Denny Kandt, Amanda Garay, Amber Lloyd and Anabell Martinez leave the Courtroom.
We all met in front of the courthouse and we talked in front of the Court fifteen or twenty
minutes.
5. I talked to Denny Kandt and the girls he was with until about 6:00 p.m. on July
28,1997, and then he appeared to have he left with the girls.
6. When Denny was talking to me outside of the courthouse, Anthony Wallace
was not present
7. I was contacted by Denny's family prior to his trial, and I was contacted by an
investigator. However, I was never contacted to testify at trial.
8. I was willing to testify if called as a witness on behalf of Denny Kandt and I
am still willing to testify to that effect.

DATED this

/ j day of January, 1998.

<dPfr«-*LMJ

ROSIE AMARO

2

State Of Utah

)
:ss
County Of Salt Lake )
On the / /

day of January, 1998, personally appeared before me, ROSIE
ioiL-guing At'l'iil.ivil, svi'i'.ir. Ih,tl llu' i.inli.'nK llii.'r„"i| L\W ii

AMARr

according to the best of information and belief and has executed the same.

/I
"wMSSim

Notary Mile

I
T

^H^-

321 Soutfc 600 East
I
Salt Lake Ci^. Utah 84121 J
My Commission Expires 1

FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE

7J7\

v day (-1, I „ 1111,1 < 11 v, I" -' »"'' S, a 11 u c an J correct copy
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT was faxed/mailed First Class, postage prepaid to:
CYH. CASTLE
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
DATED this _L-L

day of January, 1998.

